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corporating the forward contracting of inputs into a model of farmer decision making. Explicit in the Key words: forward contract, decision making, model is the tradeoff between the quantity of input price discount, risk aversion to be purchased in advance (prior to when inputs are actually allocated) at the forward price, and the I/ost research on responses to agricultural proremaining portion to be purchased subsequently on duction risk has focused on the output side of the the spot market. A numerical example of forward production process, particularly when considering contracting fertilizer used in corn production is used forward and futures contracts (e.g., McKinnon 1967;  to illustrate the model. The optimal forward conChavas and Pope 1982; Anderson and Danthine tracting decision is characterized in terms of the 1983). Some attention has been given to the impact probability distribution of corn and fertilizer prices, of risk on factors of production. For instance, Batra as well as other relevant parameters. and Ullah (1974) show how introducing output price risk into a certainty model alters output levels but
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In leaves relative input quantities unchanged. Robison the next section, a description of the forward conand Barry (1987) evaluate input demand under four tracting problem facing farmers is presented. Of conditions: output price risk; input price risk; input major concern are the decisions facing contract parquality risk; and production function risk. They also ticipants, the economic incentives that underlie the introduce flexibility by allowing the firm to select agreement, and the possible tradeoffs involved when one input after the uncertainty is resolved (see also operating in a risky environment. The following Hartman 1975; Holthausen 1976 ). This approach section presents the model and derives a decision allows the decision maker to respond to new or rule for optimal forward contracting of inputs. Fichanging conditions. In each of these cases, hownally, the numerical example is presented by estimatever, the research has assumed spot factor markets ing an optimal forward contract ratio for fertilizer only, with no forward contracting of inputs. But used in corn production. The optimal ratio is commany farmers forward purchase a portion of their puted over a range of different parameter values in order to illustrate key points about the forward conwhen the forward contracting decision is made. This tracting decision.
is an oversimplification for most actual agricultural production processes which have stochastic yields EXCHANGE IN FORWARD CONTRACTS and which allow adjustment of input levels at various FOR INPUTS points throughout the process. However, the model Forward contracting for inputs is a practice which can be thought of as the second stage of a two-stage is usually initiated by the manufacturer. The manudecision process, in which the optimal level of total facturer's primary incentive to forward sell is to input allocations is chosen first and the optimal improve the firm's planning capacity. There are subproportion of total requirements to forward contract stantial risks surrounding some input markets, paris chosen second. Furthermore, the fixed output asticularly regarding future prices and demand. By sumption leads to a simple forward contracting deestablishing a portion of future demand in a forward cision rule which is straightforward to derive and market, the manufacturer is able to plan for a minianalyze. Thus, the model provides a useful first step mum production level and cover variable costs.
in analyzing forward contracting in factor markets. Farmers participate in forward contracting inputs Multiple inputs can be included in the model without because it allows them to lock in a certain price changing any of the main results provided that forearlier than would be possible otherwise, and beward contracts exist for only one of the inputs, and cause it reduces risks surrounding the quality and the technology is characterized by a Leontief fixed timeliness of input deliveries. However, these incenproportions production function. tives may not be enough to induce entry into forward
The farmer is subject to a pair of budget constraints contracts. Farmers generally also require a price which define terminal wealth after output has been discount to encourage widespread participation.
realized. These constraints can be expressed as: The equilibrium forward contract price is largely a function of manufacturing costs, current input (1) Wt = (1 + r) [ W -f, b] prices, expected future input prices, and the prefer-(2) WT = PTYT + ( 1 + rt) [W -w, ( x, -b ) ] ences of farmers and input manufacturers. Although contracts often vary across firms, typically they are where Wr is initial wealth; Wt is wealth at the input of short duration (less than one year), have a fixed allocation period t; WTis terminal wealth; rT is the price, and may require substantial advance payment.
interest rate between and t; r is the interest rate This financial commitment by the farmer is usually between and T; bis theamount oftheinput forward compensated for by a price discount below the current spot price. A 5 to 10 percent discount is comcrced tis the total amount of inp mon. Once the contract is finalized, an increase in purchased by time t;f' is the forward contract price; the market price implies an ex post gain to farmers pr is the output price realized in the terminal period whereas a price decline implies an ex post loss.
(stochastic at period T); and w, is the spot price of the input in the input allocation period (stochastic at THE MODEL period T). Notice that payments for forward conConsider a three period decision environment contracted inputs are made in full at the time forward sisting of an initial period T in which inputs can be contracting takes place, while payments for inputs forward contracted; an intermediate period t in purchased on the spot market are not made until which inputs are allocated to the production process;
period t Ofcoursenopaymentisreceivedforoutput and a terminal period Tin which output is realized.
until production is realized in period T The farmer can forward contract all input requireThe farmer's objective is to choose the amount forward contracted to maximize the expected utility ments in period T if he or she chooses, or choose not forward contracted to maxiize the expected utility of terminal wealth, conditional on information availto forward contract so that all input requirements are purchased on the spot market at period t. Altemaable at time tively, the farmer may choose to forward contract some proportion of his or her requirements at T and (3) max E [ U(WT) ] purchase the remainder on the spot market at t. The b, rest of this section characterizes a model of how this decision can be made optimally.
where U is an increasing and strictly concave von The farmer is assumed to be producing a known Neumann-Morgenstern utility function; and ET indifixed level of output, yT, using a single input. Thus, cates expectation conditional on information availtotal input requirements, xt, are known in advance able at T. The maximization is subject to the wealth 146 constraints (1) and (2) . The first-order condition for By dividing through by x,, the optimal forward this problem is contracting rule can be expressed as a ratio of total input requirements: In this case we would use (10) whenever the optimal normal, then ratio is between zero and one but set the optimal forward contracting ratio to zero (one) if (10) is
The first term in the optimal forward contracting ratio (10) can be interpreted as the "hedging" or risk Using this result, the first-order condition can be management part of the decision, while the second written term can be interpreted as the "speculative" part. To see this, let the forward contract price equal the
In this case, there is no expected gain or loss from
contracting and the forward contract deci- (7) 2 (1 + rt) ( sion is aimed solely at reducing risk. This leads to -(1 + r0) fT
the pure hedging decision rule
ure of absolute risk aversion; o 2 , is the conditional (12) -= 1 -variance of wt; owp is the conditional covariance between wt and PT; and w, is the conditional expectation of wt. adT;ad ithcodtolexc On the other hand, if the forward contract price is less than the discounted expected spot price, Multiplying the first term in (7) by pTYT / PTYT where rT= ET (PT) does not change anything but -+ 11 P ~~~~~~~~ (13) wt -(1 + rt )f) > 0 allows (7) to be expressed as:
then the farmer will speculate by forward contracting (8) Y ) more than (12) in order to increase the expected
ggains from forward contracting. Similarly, if the forward contract price is greater than the discounted where R = APTYT. We interpret R as a measure of expected spot price, relative risk aversion evaluated at a wealth level that equals expected gross income from the production (14) ti-(1 + r)f T < 0 process. Further, below we analyze the sensitivity of the optimal forward contracting rule to alternative then the farmer will speculate by forward contracting values of this relative risk aversion measure. oi r tives ae tiomaure n less than (12) in order to reduce the expected losses Solving (8) for b, gives the optimal forward conSolvacting (8)rule fbgsh pfrom forward contracting. In both of the latter twõ~t ractm~in~g rule ^ ^cases, the farmer is trading off higher expected returns against increased risk. Thus, the two primary (1 + rt)Ro 2 w reduce risks and to speculate on favorable price moves. 147
The effect of an increase in relative risk aversion is The optimal forward contract ratio depends on the farmer's degree of risk aversion, the value of the that the application of 115 pounds of nitrogen per forward contract price relative to the discounted acre could be expected to yield approximately 100 expected spot price, interest rates, the average prodbushels of corn. However, anhydrous ammonia conuct of the input, the expected output price, and the tains only 82 percent nitrogen, so it takes 140 pounds covariance matrix of the output and spot input prices. of anhydrous ammonia to produce 100 bushels of In particular, if the covariance between output and corn. Converting pounds to tons (to be consistent spot input prices is positive, then the larger the with the pricing units of $/ton) gives an average covariance, the less forward contracting takes place.
product of 1430. A range of 1000 to 1800 around this The reason is that if output and input prices move average was used in this study in order to examine together, then locking in an input price via forward the model's sensitivity to changes in this parameter. contracting exposes the farmer to the risk of output
The annualized interest rate was chosen to be 10 price declines without a commensurate decline in percent. To compute r, and r, from this rate, the time input prices. In this case, the farmer avoids risk by intervals between forward contracting and fertilizer forward contracting less rather than more.
application, and between fertilizer application and corn harvest must be known. This study assumed that NUMERICAL EXAMPLE forward contracting occurs in February, that fertilAs a numerical example of how to operationalize izer is applied in May, and that harvest is in August. the optimal forward contract ratio, the case of fertilThus, assuming continuous compounding izer used in corn production was considered. This example was designed to illustrate various aspects of (15a) 1 + rT = e0 25 r = 1.025 the model, particularly with respect to relative risk (15b) + rt = e 2 5 = 1.025 aversion, the average product of the input, and the price discount received from a forward purchase. T The expected corn and spot fertilizer prices min Fertilizer data were for anhydrous ammonia and Table 1 were computed by taking a simple sample were obtained from two different sources. Six years mean of the corn and spot fertilizer price data deof monthly spot prices ($/ton) from 1982 through scribed earlier. The forward contract price was then 1988 were purchased from a private fertilizer inforcalculated by applying a price discount to the exmation service ("Green Markets"). These data repmation service ("Green Markets"). These data reppected spot fertilizer price. That is, if the price disresented agricultural fertilizer prices (FOB) for the count for forward contracting was d, then midwest corn belt. Forward contract price data ($/ton) were obtained directly from a midwest fertilizer manufacturer. Finally, monthly corn prices (16) f = Wt ($/bushel) for the same seven years were collected (1 + d) from midwest grain elevators.
The price discount for forward contracting used in To operationalize the optimal forward contract rathe numerical example ranged between 2.5 and 2.7 tio, estimates of all of the terms on the right-handpercent. side of (10) were needed. Table 1 gives a range of Because fertilizer forward contracted is usually parameter values over which the model was simusold at a price discount, the optimal forward contract lated. The average product of fertilizer used in corn ratio is likely to be quite sensitive to the degree of production was calculated based on results from farmer risk aversion. To examine this sensitivity, Vitosh, Lucas, and Black (1979). That study found relative risk aversion ranged from R = 1 to R = 3, 148 values consistent with those estimated by Friend and 
The relevant forecast errors were computed by generating three and six month forecasts from the where Awt = wt -wt-1 and Apt = p -pt-l. The 12 VAR model and subtracting these from actual price month lags were included to account for apparent realizations. The sample covariance matrix of the seasonality in the data. Estimation results are proerrors constructed in this way was then used as an vided in Table 3 . Using the Box-Pierce Q-statistic, estimate of the required conditional variance and the null hypothesis of white noise residuals in both covariance, leading to the estimates in Table 1 . (17a) and (17b) could not be rejected (Table 3) .
Results from simulating the model over the releThe covariance matrix of the one-step-ahead forevant range of parameters are shown in Table 4 . A cast errors from the VAR is standard regression striking feature of the results is that forward contract output in most econometric software. Because the ratios were very sensitive to the price discount ofdata were monthly, however, these one-step-ahead fered on forward contracts. If the price discount was forecast error covariances were not appropriate for less than or equal to 2.5 percent, then the optimal the problem at hand. As discussed earlier, it was forward contract ratio was zero (no forward conassumed that forward contracting of fertilizer occurs tracts) over the entire range chosen for other paramein February, that fertilizer application occurs in May, ters. The reason is that fertilizer prices in period 2 and that harvest is in August. Thus, an estimate of and corn prices in period 3 were positively correthe covariance matrix of the errors from a threelated. Thus, the farmer obtained a natural hedge from month-ahead forecast of fertilizer prices (February- his or her open positions by not forward contracting. May) and a six-month-ahead forecast of corn prices If corn prices fell (rose), then fertilizer prices were were needed (February-August) . This is because the also likely to fall (rise), thereby mitigating some of analysis required the variance of the spot fertilizer the detrimental (beneficial) effects of the corn price price at application and the covariance between the change. This natural hedge was lost if the farmer spot fertilizer price at application and the corn price locked in a fertilizer price via forward contracting, at harvest, both conditional on information available because the farmer was then fully exposed to the risk when forward contracting takes place.
of corn price decreases (and increases). Thus, in this 149 ing. The optimal forward contracting rule indicated that the two primary reasons farmers might particiexample, the risk minimizing forward contracting pate in forward contracts are to reduce risk (the rule was to forward contract nothing.
hedging component) and to speculate on favorable Changes in the average product also affected the price moves (the speculative component). Speculaforward contract ratio. For instance, an increase in tive activity is curtailed as farmer risk aversion inthe average product would imply that less fertilizer creases. At the limit, as farmer risk aversion was required for a given level of output. Therefore, increases to infinity, the optimal forward contracting total fertilizer needs would decline, including the rule reduces to a variance minimizing rule, which need to forward contract.
depends on the average product of the input and the At price discounts above 2.5 percent, small flucjoint distribution of input and output prices. tuations in the discount led to wild swings in forward A numerical example of forward contracting fercontracting decisions. Forward contracting declined tilizer used in corn production indicated that the size as risk aversion increased for a given price discount. of the price discount was the dominant factor in This decline occurred because farmers were using forward contracting decisions. With no price disforward contracts to speculate on favorable price count, no fertilizer was forward contracted. Furthermovements, with more forward contracting taking more, small changes in the price discount had large place as the price discount increased. Increased risk effects on the amount of fertilizer forward conaversion curbed this speculative activity and caused tracted, tending to swamp the effects of changes in the forward contracting decision to move towards other parameters in the model. This supports the theriskminimizing choice of zero forward contracts.
view that price discounts, not risk aversion or hedgIf the price discount was greater than or equal to 2.7 ing potential, are the crucial element in the forward percent, then all input requirements were forward contracting market for fertilizer.
